Have you ever had a justice or municipal court in Texas tell you that they didn’t actually need a signed and verified criminal complaint in order to have jurisdiction to conduct their sham proceedings against you?  Did you buy it hook, line, and sinker, or did you feel or know that they were as full of shit as a colostomy bag attached to a fat man at a buffet? If it was the latter, congratulations, you aren’t really as stupid overall as you were probably made to feel at the time.

However, the reason that you were made to feel stupid and powerless was because in a particular way, you were.  You weren’t educated or prepared for the bullshit games they like to play in these courts, which can be best described only as a form of judicial three card monte, “Where’s your rights! C’mon, follow your rights! Are they on the left, right, the middle? C’mon, choose and show me!”

Well, in this article I am attempting to provide you with some information that should help you, provided you make the effort to actually help yourself by learning it. What you are about to read is easily verified using the State of Texas’ own legislative web site. On this site are all the codes and the Texas Constitution that are referenced in this article.

http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/

All you have to do is learn what they are, where they are, and how to argue what you know about them from doing so. This article is about how to make and integrate those arguments into a legal pleading, whether that pleading demands a dismissal, or is challenging the courts jurisdiction, or challenging the form and substance of a complaint or charging instrument, and, thus, challenging its actual validity for the intended purpose. In relation to these lower courts and class of cases, a citation and complaint are all you will normally have to contend with and fully understand the proper procedural requirements and usages of.  This is constitutionally improper in this author’s opinion, but what can you expect when you are dealing with a collection of attorneys that actually believe they are fundamentally more intellectual, intelligent, and wiser than everyone else.

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SB 971 (“Transportation” Code) Prosecutions Will Always Fail Due Process Muster

Respondent’s Challenge to Citation as a Valid Charging Instrument

Rationally speaking, due to numerous violations of Respondent’s right of due process and legal conflicts both with those due process rights and other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, neither the citation nor the complaint in this matter are legally sufficient in and of themselves to invest the court with jurisdiction.

The citation suffers from multiple legal conflicts in that it does not meet all of the mandatory statutory requirements of a valid complaint pursuant §45.019(a), Code of Criminal Procedure, nor does there exist any waiver mutually agreed upon and signed by the Accused and the alleged Attorney for the State that has been submitted to the court pursuant § 27.14(d), Code of Criminal Procedure, yet another legal conflict. This waiver is mandatory before the court is authorized to use a citation in lieu of a valid verified complaint, and there is no such waiver signed by Respondent.

The citation also suffers from multiple conflicts with Respondent’s right of due process; the citation is not in any way signed and verified; the citation does not contain the required legal language intended to provide proper, sufficient, and timely notice to an accused individual of the specific allegations being made against them; the citation does not and is not required to state all of the legal elements required to be proven for each allegation made upon its face; the allegations made on the face of a citation may or may not be the same as those stated in an actual criminal complaint.

Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has long ago (unconstitutionally) set the minimum bar investing jurisdiction in justice and municipal courts to the actual filing of a sworn complaint. An opinion which Respondent would argue is also unconstitutional and illegal on its face pursuant both Art. 5, §12(b), Texas Constitution, and §1.05, Code of Criminal Procedure. Leaving the only logical conclusion to the issue be that, for the moment, anything less than a signed and verified criminal complaint is a failure to provide proper, sufficient and timely notice to Respondent, which, in turn, is a complete denial of substantive and procedural due process rights. Thus, the citation alone is consistently repudiated by mandatory requirements of a constitutional, statutory, and due process nature that make it legally insufficient to ever invoke a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Respondent’s Challenge to the  Form, Substance, Constitutional, and Statutory Insufficiencies of the Criminal Complaint as a Valid Charging Instrument

For the purpose of clarification and brevity in the following discussion on the related statutory impact to criminal complaints, Respondent must establish common points of reference in relation to certain terminology that will be used throughout.

“Regulated Subject Matter” shall mean the regulated occupation of “transportation” as specifically stated and intended by the Texas Legislature in the Bill Caption of SB 971 as contextually pertaining and relevant to the entirety of the “Transportation Code,” the Bill Caption being “AN ACT relating to the adoption of a nonsubstantive revision of statutes relating to transportation, including conforming amendments, repeals, and penalties.” [1] (Emphasis added)

“Transportation” [2] shall have the same meaning as is found in Black’s Law Dictionary 6^th Edition “The movement of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier. Interstate Commerce Com’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S.Ct. 1125, 38 L.Ed. 1047.”

“Carrier” [3] shall have the same meaning as is found in Black’s Law Dictionary 6^th Edition “Individual or organization engaged in transporting passengers or goods for hire. “Carrier” means any person engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by land, as a common, contract, or private carrier, or freight forwarder as those terms are used in the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, and officers, agents and employees of such carriers. 18 U.S.C.A. § 831.”

“Alleged Attorney for the State” shall mean any attorney practicing in this state that is neither a properly elected or appointed and duly sworn County or District Attorney pursuant all requirements for same as mandated by the Texas Constitution, or that is not directly employed thereby as a full-time Assistant County or District Attorney acting under the constitutionally delegated lawful authority of that office. The term shall include, but is not limited to, any city/municipal attorney or any attorney in private practice acting under contract or other form of agreement with any city, town, village, municipality or county.

As to the complaint itself, it cannot be reasonably asserted or argued that the complaint contains the required legal language intended to provide proper, sufficient, and timely notice to an accused individual of the allegations being made against them as there is no legal requirement in statute for a criminal complaint created under either §§15.05 or 45.019(a), Code of Criminal Procedure, to state all of the legal elements required to be proven for each allegation made upon its face, which itself is a violation of Respondent’s right of due process.

The complaint is legally insufficient and violates Respondent’s right of due process as it does not state any facts alleging or relating to the Regulated Subject Matter under which the alleged failure to perform a legal duty actually exists, which Respondent Exhibit “A” very clearly states is that of “transportation.” Respondent submits that the entire Regulated Subject Matter of SB 971 exists solely to regulate the underlying activities and functions directly associated with engaging in the commercial/economic occupation of “transportation,” and in no way whatsoever was it intended or enacted for the purpose of placing the individual rights and private property of the People under the STATE’s presumptive regulatory and licensing authority via the ‘police power.’

Thus, the prosecution and the court are attempting to invoke subject matter and in personam jurisdiction not through actual facts and evidence proving such jurisdiction, but through an unconstitutional application of analytically backward progressing inferences based entirely on an initial irrebuttable presumption, i.e. “The STATE accuses Respondent of “driving” a “motor vehicle” in violation of specific and multiple sections of the “transportation” code, which regulates only “transportation,” which is a term with a specific legal and industry applicable meaning of which we claim or pretend to have no actual knowledge or understanding. But, considering that we did no actual investigation into, and have no actual facts or evidence to support, the entirely presumptive claim that Respondent was actually engaging in the Regulated Subject Matter of “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, we will fabricate the illusory presumption needed by using statutorily related terminology that is otherwise only legally applicable to such activity, thus fabricating an offense that legally could and would apply only if Respondent were so engaged.”

It cannot be overstated that the complaint (or any other existing charging instrument) contains no assertion of evidentiary elements and facts relating to Respondent actively engaging in the Regulated Subject Matter of “transportation,” because there are none! And the Alleged Attorney for the State could have known and should have known that there is no subject matter creating a legal duty upon Respondent without them and the necessary admissible evidence to prove them. Any and all other facts alleged in the complaint(s) are themselves nothing more than subordinate criteria legally and logically existing only as directly subordinate subject matter components to the primary subject matter under which they are codified within SB 971, that of “transportation.”

It should be axiomatic that without evidentiary proof that Respondent was engaging in the overall parent subject matter, any alleged violation of a strictly subordinate legal duty thereunder cannot legally exist or stand as binding upon Respondent absent factual consideration and evidence that s/he was actively engaging in “transportation.” The regulated activity of “transportation” alone is the primary subject matter governing the alleged violation, and its existence must be asserted in the complaint and proven upon the record of the court in order for both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction to be invested in the court, because jurisdiction is invested in such courts only when an offense against a public duty directly related to that specific subject matter activity can be proven on the record.

Respondent can fathom only four possible means by which the STATE could even hope to provide evidence that s/he was actively engaged in the Regulated Subject Matter of “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense. Such evidence would necessarily be comprised of either a bill of lading, a passenger manifest, a commercial logbook, or a signed confession. All of which would be required to show specific facts proving that Respondent was actively engaged in “transportation” at the time. Absent this evidence STATE’s entire case is not merely circumstantial, it is entirely presumptive and legally unsubstantiated, and, therefore, is nothing less than a kangaroo court conducting kangaroo proceedings that violate Respondents fundamental rights of due process by attempting to convict him/her of a crime based solely on presumption, inference, and speculation, without a single piece of factual evidence supporting any of it.

The constitutionally required Caption found on Page 1 of SB 971 provides Respondent with all the necessary evidence to reasonably conclude that the Legislature’s sole intent upon enacting SB 971 was to regulate the commercial occupation known as “transportation,” and only those subjects, objects, and activities necessarily subordinate and ancillary thereto, and nothing else. There is also ample indication within multiple subordinate subject matter provisions of the Bill itself that its only intended nature and application was that of regulating commercial use of the public highways for the general safety of the traveling public, for whom the highways are built and used for their own private business and pleasure as a matter of fundamental right.

However, this readily available and easily understandable evidence has done nothing to prevent every law enforcement agency and court throughout Texas from unconstitutionally and illegally attempting to expand SB 971’s very limited intended application to everyone and everything upon our Texas highways under the ever growing cancerous tumor upon freedom and liberty that is the ‘police power,’ regardless of the fact that a great many of the People unlawfully and illegally subjected to its punitive measures via executive and judicial harassment and outright corruption have no legal duty under any provision of SB 971, as it never applied to them or Respondent in any way absent evidentiary proof of engaging in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

In short, as the moving party in the instant matter, the STATE lawfully and legally bears the full burden of proving every element of an allegation. In this particular case, an allegation that as a matter of law must begin with proof that Respondent was actively engaged in the subject matter regulated occupation of “transportation.” Only after that fact is established by submission of at least one of the aforementioned pieces of evidence, can the STATE attempt to prove that Respondent was acting in the legal capacity of a compensated “carrier,” or simultaneously as both a compensated “carrier” and “operator/driver,” or even as a compensated “operator/driver” employed by a “carrier.”

Therefore, it is only after establishing that Respondent was actively engaged in “transportation” that the STATE can legally attempt to prove that was Respondent was in physical control of a “motor vehicle,” as the term “motor vehicle” is only applicable when the device is being actively used by an “operator” or “driver” to engage in the Regulated Subject Matter that is the commercial occupation of “transportation.” Respondent’s private fundamental right to liberty through locomotion and travel for his/her own personal business and pleasure, or for the purpose of moving his own person or property upon the highways as a matter of right, does not constitute engaging in “transportation” as that subject matter was intended to be regulated by SB 971.

Finally, there is no actual constitutionally compliant charging instrument investing this court with jurisdiction in the required form of an indictment or information as required by Art. 5, §§12(b) and 17 of the Texas Constitution, as well as §§2.04 and 2.05, Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein an information is required to be prepared and filed in any misdemeanor case, in any court within any county where there exists a County Attorney. Respondent can find no such instrument in the court record.

Furthermore, the current case law on the subject of pursuing prosecutions in municipal and justice courts by complaint alone has failed at every turn to examine the clearly stated requirements of §§2.04 and 2.05, Code of Criminal Procedure, and integrate them into its judicial opinions. Which is extremely odd and telling as both of these articles have been mandatory procedural law since enacted by the 59^th Legislature in 1965.

Thus, Respondent can only conclude that this decades old ongoing failure of every level of our Texas Courts to fully comply with lawfully enacted provisions governing criminal procedure is knowing and willful subversion in order to facilitate the process of speedier prosecutions at the expense of proper jurisdictional and due process requisites, meaning that the courts have decided that they now have the power to both ignore legislatively enacted procedures for criminal cases as well as to rewrite those processes to work however the courts themselves please. Respondent is left wondering if the Texas Supreme Court would have a problem with defending such behavior if the issue were raised in a lawsuit over the multitude of unlawful and illegal due process and jurisdictional issues it creates.

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Footnotes:

[1] Respondent Exhibit “A” – Texas Secretary of State Certified copy of Page 1, Bill Caption SB 971, 74^th Legislature, 1995.

[2] At no time did the Texas Legislature see fit to statutorily define the term “transportation” within SB 971, the current amended version of the “Transportation” Code, or any other statutory code in the entirety of Texas legislation. Therefore, under the rules of statutory interpretation and construction, Respondent has supplied the common legal definition as currently utilized and applicable to the areas of related law and industry.

[3] As with the term “transportation,” the Texas Legislature did not see fit to statutorily define the singular term “carrier” within SB 971 or the current amended version of the “Transportation” Code. The closest defined phrase is “motor carrier” within §643.001(6). Therefore, under the rules of statutory interpretation and construction, Respondent has supplied the common legal definition as currently utilized and applicable to the areas of related law and industry.

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I hope that this gives you some idea of what is being done to you and how.  I hope even more that it pisses you off to such a degree that you will fight every ticket you receive for the rest of your living days upon this Earth, and that you will make it your mission in that life to convince everyone you know or meet to do the same. Because, if everyone did, the entire system that has foisted this unconstitutional scheme of regulatory theft upon us all would collapse under its own financial weight within a matter of weeks or days.