Challenging the Complaint in a “Transportation” Related Offense – Failure to State All Legal Elements Means Insufficient Substance and Notice.


Author:   Eddie Craig,    March 07, 2016
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Elements Stated in Criminal Complaint and Related Charging Instrument(s) are Insufficient to Charge an Offense and Provide Notice of Same.

Respondent has never seen an accused individual in any alleged criminal offense that was allegedly perpetrated under the statutory scheme of the “transportation” code, including him/herself, provided with proper, sufficient and timely Notice of the allegations being made nor of the necessary individual elements that s/he must understand and plead to for each charge. Each element of which STATE must also prove at trial in relation to that specific charge. Respondent has never seen a criminal complaint filed in such cases that complies with Respondent’s fundamental right to procedural and substantive due process by providing Notice in the aforementioned required manner. Making this not merely a case of unintentional appealable error, but a knowing and willful violation of Respondent’s right of due process through willful failure by the prosecution to provide proper, sufficient and timely Notice of the allegations and their individual elements amid the courts colluding with the prosecution to deny that right to each individual forcibly compelled under threat, duress and coercion to appear before it.

In the appeal and habeas petition relating to the 2nd degree murder case of Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 1976, the United States Supreme Court stated, “The question presented is whether a defendant may enter a voluntary plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder without being informed that intent to cause the death of his victim was an element of the offense.

Henderson argued that, since he was never informed of what specific criminal elements he was actually admitting to by his submitting of a plea, and that those omitted elements were a requisite of the offense charged, he could not have possibly made an informed, and, thus, voluntary plea. Which begs the question, how is it constitutionally possible to provide the Accused in any lesser Class of criminal allegation with actual due process when the STATE is allowed to provide Notice of only a portion of the required elements in the complaint(s) and charging instrument(s), and then be held responsible at trial to prove only those elements that STATE chose to allege rather than all that are required to exist before there could even be an offense committed?  This is assuming of course that the prosecution actually ever provided Notice at all.

This denial of due process is then compounded by the court itself through its own intentionally misleading statements to Respondent and others similarly situated as to the nature and cause of the allegations. The court has almost always begun with the false assertion that the nature of the allegations against Respondent are “criminal.” This is, and is easily proven to be, an outright lie being propagated by the judge him/herself, because any actual crime requires two things that Class C fine-only misdemeanor cases apparently aren’t required to have, actual willful intent to commit the crime (criminal intent, i.e. mens rea), and an actual or intended injured party (corpus delicti) as a result of the crime. The standard common law test requiring a culpable mental state for criminal liability to attach is usually expressed in the Latin phrase, actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, which means “the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty.” Thus, from the very beginning, the right to Notice and a fair and impartial trial has been fully denied by the false assertions of fact and the related procedural improprieties of the court itself.

Furthermore, when Respondent refused to accept this blanket explanation and actually continued pressing the court about these due process discrepancies, the court eventually changed its original position and story by finally admitting to Respondent that the nature of the allegations is actually something called “quasi-criminal.” Respondent has never knowingly or willingly consented to nor accepted any legal duty or liability relating to some alleged “quasi-criminal” jurisdiction that is not specifically authorized by law to even exist. Respondent has been unable to identify any lawful authority whatsoever for any such jurisdiction as that of “quasi-criminal,” or any written and accessible rules and procedures governing any such procedural or jurisdictional capacity. Respondent understands this to be the equivalent of being forced to play a game with either no set rules and procedures at all, or a set that is available and usable only by the prosecutorial side of the game.

The only statutory and constitutional evidence Respondent can find makes it clear that Texas courts such as this one are invested only with “criminal” jurisdiction, not “quasi-criminal,” and then only for specifically defined acts that are allegedly codified as “crimes” but don’t actually authorize incarceration as a consequence of judgement, and despite the failure of the Legislature to abide by common law principles requiring the statutes and the prosecution to include the necessary elements of an actual crime. Furthermore, by law, Texas municipal courts lack civil jurisdiction of any kind, except in cases hearing administrative appeals relating to red light camera suits, which themselves are constitutionally outlawed as non-judicial punishments constituting a forbidden Bill of Pains and Penalties. Instead, they are rubber-stamping these ‘civil notices’ as “citations,” and then using them to illegally conduct administrative-only tribunals in place of the civil lawsuit that is statutorily mandated in pursuit of collecting for an alleged “red light camera” violation.

Thus, Respondent has reason to believe and does believe that, by making such an admission, the court is actually confessing that the Legislature knowingly conspired to create the false and fraudulent appearance and public perception that these alleged malum prohibitum statutory offenses are actual “crimes.” It must also be acknowledged that, if this assertion is accurate, and Respondent fully believes that it is, it would be inconceivable that the Legislature is not also knowingly allowing the courts and prosecutors to intentionally mislead and violate the rights of Respondent and all others similarly situated by their willful misrepresentation of the nature of the allegations as being “criminal,” while actually knowing them to be something else of a heretofore entirely unknown and undisclosed nature and jurisdiction called “quasi-criminal.” Which Respondent also believes consequentially allows the courts to completely fabricate or cherry-pick whatever procedural rules they wish to actually apply and use to control the adjudicatory process for this new class of jurisdiction, while also enabling them to completely ignore all of those that actually do exist so as to ensure the rule of law, a fair and impartial proceeding, and the protection of the due process rights of Respondent and others similarly situated. Leaving Respondent wondering, can you call this anything other than an “ongoing criminal enterprise,” because it certainly isn’t a justice system?

These facts make it inarguable that this process is intentionally engineered and manipulated to function in this way, and that it is fully intended to deny Respondent and others similarly situated in their right and ability to know what the actual rules of the system really are, thus, making it impossible for Respondent and others similarly situated to properly reference and utilize those rules to defend themselves against such allegations. This gross manipulation of the adjudicatory process in such proceedings is both completely unconstitutional and unconscionable, as it is nothing less than a total violation of every single aspect of Respondent’s fundamental rights necessary to provide proper due process.

Which then leads us to another question of Respondent’s alleged legal liability pertaining to an alleged offense for failure to perform an alleged legal duty codified in a malum prohibitum statute. How can any offense under a malum prohibitum statute be alleged without specifically stating the factual elements asserting that the Accused was actively engaged in the primary regulated subject matter as statutorily required before the actual offense and its other related elements can legally exist and be charged? For example, an individual cannot be charged with a violation of a commercial fishing statute unless the state can assert and prove, first and foremost, that the individual was actually engaged in the regulated activity of commercial fishing. This element must be alleged in the complaint and charging instrument, that the individual was so engaged, and then it must be proven at trial. Without the existence of this activity and its allegation as a necessary fact element, then any alleged offense subordinate to that activity is being falsely asserted and charged in the complaint and charging instrument(s), is actually impossible to prove at trial, even in conjunction with the other elements of the actual offense. Anything else is a failure to allege and prove all of the necessary fact elements required to be alleged and proven, a fundamental denial of the right to Notice so as to make an informed plea and a diligent defense, and a denial of due process in its most basic sense.

Which exposes yet another due process issue within Texas Courts in relation to the Code of Criminal Procedure, that of allowing the court to enter a default plea of “not guilty” for Respondent and others similarly situated. This court has stated its intent to enter such a plea on behalf of Respondent and others similarly situated despite the fact that Respondent was never given proper, sufficient and timely Notice of the charges due to the prosecutions failure to state all of the required individual elements of each charge so that Respondent and those similarly situated are able to make any sort of informed and voluntary plea. A procedure that this court appears to routinely practice by intentionally misconstruing an accused individual’s conditional declination to enter an uninformed and, therefore, unconscionable plea, as an outright refusal to enter an informed plea.

The court willfully and intentionally chooses to ignore these facts and proceeds forward in the matter, despite Respondent clearly stating that the reason s/he cannot make an informed plea, rather than an unconscionable one, is because his/her right to proper, sufficient and timely Notice of the allegation(s) and their respective elements have not been complied with by the STATE. And despite being advised of this, this court invariable chooses to abrogate and derogate the due process right of Respondent to have proper, sufficient and timely Notice as an ‘inconvenience’ to its procedures, rather than as a fundamental right of Respondent. Furthermore, when Respondent or others similarly situated object, and demand that the plea be withdrawn as having been entered by the court unconscionably, the court resorts to veiled or overt threats of charging Respondent or those similarly situated with contempt and incarceration in an effort to ensure that no objections to its rights-depriving actions are made for the record.

Respondent believes that the courts wage this war on his/her fundamental rights in a combination of ways, usually beginning with conspiracy and collusion between the judge and the prosecutor to intentionally circumvent or outright refuse to comply with the mandatory provisions of §45.018(b), Code of Criminal Procedure. The language of §45.018(b) certainly appears to be creating a statutory right in favor of Respondent, one requiring the STATE and the court to comply with its provisions. At least, that is how Respondent interprets the provisions of §311.016(4), Texas Government Code, in relation to  language of “is entitled to.”

However, if Respondent’s prior assertions relating to the court’s claim of a “quasi-criminal” jurisdiction is even remotely accurate, it would make complete sense that the court and prosecution would ignore this procedural requirement and statutory right of the Accused as relating only to a “criminal” proceeding and not a “quasi-criminal” proceeding. Which appears to be exactly what this court has done by its refusal to dismiss the case or to make any entry of such findings of fact and conclusions of law into the record of the proceedings, which a due process violation of such an egregious nature demands be done.

Despite this fact, these courts and prosecutors routinely fail to provide a copy of the complaint to the Accused until the actual day of trial, or only after it has been demanded, and then only if the Accused is knowledgeable enough to know that they have a right to it and should demand it. However, the prosecution virtually never provides a proper charging instrument in the form of an indictment or information as is required by Texas Constitution Art. 5, §12(b) or §§2.04-.05 and Chapter 21, Code of Criminal Procedure. Even more disconcerting is the fact that the primary case law on this subject says the prosecution and the court don’t have to comply with either the constitutional or statutory requirement because of a previous completely incorrect reading and understanding of another related constitutional provision and the requirements codified in §§2.04-.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which the controlling case opinion completely ignores and conflicts with. This failure to provide Notice is fairly routine, despite the court and the prosecution being specifically directed in that the Accused has a right to be served with the complaint “… not later than the day before the date of any proceeding in the prosecution of the defendant under the complaint.

Art. 45.018. COMPLAINT.

(a) For purposes of this chapter, a complaint is a sworn allegation charging the accused with the commission of an offense.

(b) A defendant is entitled to notice of a complaint against the defendant not later than the day before the date of any proceeding in the prosecution of the defendant under the complaint. The defendant may waive the right to notice granted by this subsection.

Furthermore, the prosecutors in many jurisdictions simply disregard this failure to provide service of the complaint as the fault of the Accused themselves, by alleging that, on some past date, on some web site that is totally unknown to the Accused, the prosecutor allegedly posted a copy of the complaint. The prosecutor then makes the claim that they have no liability to provide service, and, therefore, are in no way responsible for the denial of the right of due process by his or her failure to provide proper, sufficient and timely Notice in one of the legally valid methods prescribed by law.

This lack of Notice and the subsequent deprivation of Respondent’s rights that cascade from it is then ignored and upheld by the court, even though the prosecution has readily admitted that, at no time was the Accused ever actually provided with the necessary case file or web site information, or even its online location, so as to access this copy of the complaint. The court does all of this while wholly ignoring that this manner of service is not authorized by law in any way whatsoever, and is legally invalid. But, since the court controls the record, it makes all the necessary entries to cover up all of these rights violations precipitated by the prosecutor’s misconduct, as well as its own.

However, service by the STATE on the day of trial denies the Accused in the exercise of other rights to which s/he is rightfully entitled as a matter of both procedural and substantive due process. One such right is the right to challenge the form and substance of the complaint and that of any other charging instrument, as that right would be automatically denied as an operation of law pursuant §45.019(f), which reads:

(f) If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in a charging instrument before the date on which the trial on the merits commences, the defendant waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity. Nothing in this article prohibits a trial court from requiring that an objection to a charging instrument be made at an earlier time.
(Emphasis added).

By making the argument that STATE’s failure to comply with the provisions of §§2.04-.05 and §45.018(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (by not creating a proper charging instrument based upon the complaint and not performing actual service of the complaint and charging instrument upon the Accused) is neither relevant nor required in a “quasi-criminal” matter, the court puts forth the concept that the STATE is not required, and bears no legal duty, to provide proper, sufficient and timely Notice of the allegations to Respondent or those similarly situated. Nor, apparently, is STATE required to fully disclose or prove the individual elements of each charge, either in whole or in part, in a “quasi-criminal” matter, because the prosecution and the court do not consider this to actually be a “criminal” matter or proceeding to which the rights and rules of actual “criminal” procedure apply. Thus creating the appearance, at least in Respondent’s mind, that the court and the prosecution both fully believe that proper, sufficient and timely Notice isn’t necessary or required in “quasi-criminal” proceedings, because the game has already been rigged to this point so that the Accused couldn’t possibly win anyway due to being denied any actual knowledge or access to the full plethora of whatever conjured rules and procedures truly apply and control the process.

Furthermore, the likelihood of the Accused properly and timely perfecting and following through with an appeal, while complying with the intentionally misleading and disparate rules and procedures for doing so, and depending upon whether the trial was held in a court of record versus a court of no record, is relatively small. After all, there are apparently no written rules available for a “quasi-criminal” jurisdiction and proceeding to which the Accused has any access to or even knowledge of. Thus, s/he will have no idea how to properly and successfully prepare their appeal in such cases, considering that the normal “criminal” or “civil” procedure rules governing such matters aren’t being followed or applied by the prosecutors or the courts, which Respondent can only interpret to mean that those codified procedural rules must not be considered to actually apply in “quasi-criminal” proceedings.

Therefore, since the action is actually “quasi-criminal” rather than “criminal,” why should the prosecution and the court be required to comply with the statutory and due process rights of the Accused as written into the Texas Constitution’s Bill of Rights or the Code of Criminal Procedure, both of which would be required to be followed for every other form of allegedly “criminal” case, but neither of which the courts consider as having any applicability to the rights of Respondent and others similarly situated in such “quasi-criminal” proceedings. Which actually makes sense considering that in every single instance where Respondent has attempted to raise the issue of state and federal constitutional protections, the judge of the court invariably bangs their gavel and literally screams out that neither constitution, nor their particular individual protections, ever apply or matter in their courtroom! Respondent sees this as an everyday example of the judicial and governmental corruption and destruction of the People’s unalienable rights at its finest, rig the game, fix the outcome, then just sit back and reap the windfall profits from the fraudulent con, all based upon a Bill of Pains and Penalties form of adjudication that has been constitutionally outlawed and forbidden for more than two centuries.

Respondent believes this to be nothing less than treason against the people, as Arts. 1, §29 and Art. 3, §62(a) the Texas Constitution forbids the suspension of the People’s Bill of Rights for any reason, or by any department of government. In pertinent part, §3, §62(a) reads “… Article I of the Constitution of Texas, known as the “Bill of Rights” shall not be in any manner affected, amended, impaired, suspended, repealed or suspended hereby.” Which means that there can be no such law that would authorize such a declaration of suspension or removal by the legislature at all, much less the courts, who cannot make law. Leaving the only reasonable conclusion to be that the courts have created and usurped for themselves a completely unconstitutional and unconscionable power to suspend Respondent’s ability to invoke and demand obedience to his/her Bill of Rights and its protections.

Sec. 29. PROVISIONS OF BILL OF RIGHTS EXCEPTED FROM POWERS OF GOVERNMENT; TO FOREVER REMAIN INVIOLATE.

To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare that everything in this “Bill of Rights” is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall be void.

In Henderson, ibid, the court went on to say “Held: Since respondent did not receive adequate notice of the offense to which he pleaded guilty, his plea was involuntary and the judgment of conviction was entered without due process of law. The plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless respondent received “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process. Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334.” (Internal quotations omitted, emphasis added).

When Respondent, or those similarly situated, has not been provided proper, sufficient and timely Notice, and the complaint and charging instruments are facially devoid of any of the elements constituting an actual “crime” as well as any allegation stating the actual existence of the primary subject matter element upon which the malum prohibitum allegation itself must rely in order to be valid and subsequently invoke the jurisdiction of this or any other court, there should be no question whatsoever that due process has been denied and that a conviction is invalid upon its face and must be overturned. This is precisely the issues that exist in every “transportation” related prosecution that Respondent has ever witnessed or been a victimized party of by being forcibly compelled to participate against his/her will and consent.

Respondent fully believes that the logic as to what elements must be asserted in the charging instrument(s) and then proven at trial in a “transportation” case is not difficult to understand. But having to clearly identify and inform the Accused of each and every one of the necessary elements is extremely inconvenient and detrimental for the STATE’s case, even though the right of due process in the form of Notice and evidentiary proof of the alleged offense demands and requires it. Why would providing proper, sufficient and timely Notice of every required element of the allegation to the Accused not only make it difficult, but actually prejudice the STATE’s case? Because it would provide the Accused with an undeniable and absolute affirmative defense against prosecution in such cases, especially when the STATE cannot assert and prove that the Accused actually committed a “crime” or was ever knowingly and voluntarily engaged in the regulated subject matter of “transportation.”

Respondent further believes that STATE’s fear in these cases is that such an affirmative defense would surely have the subsequent effect of virtually drying up the STATE and local political subdivision’s generation of obscene amounts of revenue through knowing and intentional perpetration of extortion and fraud upon the People by a willful misinterpretation and misapplication of the “transportation” code created by SB 971. And it undoubtedly would, but so what? Why should the STATE and its political subdivisions be allowed to profit from defrauding and extorting the public?

The Legislature made it very clear in the Title of SB 971 that the statutory scheme created by it related to one subject and one subject only, “transportation!”

The Bill Title of SB 971 reads:

AN ACT relating to the adoption of a nonsubstantive revision of statutes relating to transportation, including conforming amendments, repeals, and penalties.
(Emphasis added)

The evidence supporting the assertion that this is and can be the one and only subject matter intended to be regulated by the Legislature is found in Art. 3, §35, Texas Constitution:

Sec. 35. SUBJECTS AND TITLES OF BILLS.

(a)  No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject.

(b) The rules of procedure of each house shall require that the subject of each bill be expressed in its title in a manner that gives the legislature and the public reasonable notice of that subject. The legislature is solely responsible for determining compliance with the rule.

(c) A law, including a law enacted before the effective date of this subsection, may not be held void on the basis of an insufficient title.

(Subsec. (a) amended and (b) and (c) added Nov. 4, 1986.)

Anyone without an unlawful agenda and ulterior motive can see that the plain language of this constitutional provision tells us, just as the language in the Title of SB 971 tells us, that the only subject matter stated in the Title as being intended to be regulated by SB 971 is that of “transportation.” Under the separation of powers clause of Art. 2, Texas Constitution, neither the courts nor the executive departments of Texas government have any authority to either interpret or enforce the provisions of SB 971 in a manner intended to expand the regulated subject matter beyond that of “transportation” as declared by the Legislature. The United States Supreme Court has even ruled that “The title of a statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s text.” INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991).” The courts of Texas are no freer to rewrite the laws of the Legislature than the federal courts are to rewrite those of Congress. The courts must interpret the laws and statutes based upon the language in them, not upon their own opinion or interpretation outside of or in complete disregard of that language. “The question ….is not what Congress would have wanted but what Congress enacted.” Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).

Every single offense created and codified into the “transportation” code by SB 971 that can be alleged against an individual thereunder falls within and subordinate solely to the subject matter of “transportation.” Thus, making the primary element required to be stated in the complaint and charging instrument(s) relating to any such alleged offense, the clear assertion that the offense was committed while the Accused individual was engaged in an act of “transportation” at the time. Why? Because the due process right of Notice and the fact that the STATE bears the burden of proving every element of an alleged offense demands that it be so, and because it is impossible to commit a “transportation” related offense if an individual was never engaged in “transportation” in the first place, just like it is impossible for someone to commit a “commercial fishing” offense without first being engaged in “commercial fishing.”

The court also concluded in Henderson that “… his guilty plea was involuntary because, inter alia, he was not aware that intent to cause death was an element of second-degree murder.Henderson, ibid.

Again, follow the logic; the terms “driver” and “operator” are legal terms and capacities created by the statutory scheme of SB 971, which, as we have already seen, relates solely to the subject matter of “transportation,” and everything within the “transportation” code must be subordinately related to that subject matter as a matter of constitutional requirement, and, therefore, so must the law and statutes themselves. The same holds true for all the other legal terms defined by SB 971 relating to any alleged legal duty, processes, objects, devices, and other actions within the statutory scheme created by SB 971. They all must relate solely to the subject matter of “transportation” in order to comply with the provisions of Art. 3, §35, Texas Constitution.

Therefore, logic and reason dictates that no individual, including Respondent, can be legally termed and presented to a court in a criminal complaint as a “driver” or “operator” unless the individual is first and foremost asserted and presented as having been engaged in the business of “transportation” for the private profit or gain of either himself or some third-party employer as a “carrier” doing business for compensation or hire at the time of the alleged offense.

Further, logic and reason would also dictate that no individual, including Respondent, can be legally termed and presented to a court in a criminal complaint as a “driver” or “operator” unless the individual is first and foremost asserted and presented as having been engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, as “transportation” alone is the primary subject matter of SB 971 and the “transportation” code created by it. And it is within this subject matter only that all of these legal terms, phrases, objects, devices, procedures, and subordinate ancillary subjects and offenses are created and applicable. In short, there is no offense unless it is first asserted and proven that “transportation” was being engaged in by Respondent or others similarly situated at the time of the alleged offense.

Further still, logic and reason also dictates that no device propelled by a motor, engine, or other method of self-propulsion, including Respondent’s private conveyance of choice, can be legally termed and presented to a court in a criminal complaint as a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle/ motorcycle/ moped,” unless the individual is first and foremost asserted and presented as having been engaged in the regulated subject matter of “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, as “transportation” alone is the primary subject matter of SB 971 under which all of these legal terms, phrases, objects, devices, procedures, and subordinate ancillary subjects and offenses are created and applicable. In short, there is no offense unless it is first proven that “transportation” was being engaged in by Respondent or others similarly situated at the time of the alleged offense.

And lastly, logic and reason would necessarily dictate that no device propelled by a motor, engine, or other method of self-propulsion, including Respondent’s private conveyance of choice, can be legally termed and presented to a court in a criminal complaint as a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle/ motorcycle/ moped,” unless the individual is first and foremost asserted and presented as having been engaged in the regulated subject matter of “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, as “transportation” alone is the primary subject matter of SB 971 under which all of these legal terms, phrases, objects, devices, procedures, and subordinate ancillary subjects and offenses are created and applicable. In short, there is no offense unless it is first proven that “transportation” was being engaged in by Respondent or others similarly situated at the time of the alleged offense.

In which case, Respondent is left with the conclusion that the court can be invested with subject matter and in personam jurisdiction in a “transportation” case only if “transportation” is relevant to the case as a matter of law. If there is no allegation and evidence of Respondent or any other similarly situated Accused individual having been engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, then there is no subject matter involvement, and, thus, no offense by which the court can be invested with jurisdiction of the cause. Therefore, Respondent puts forth the logical assertion of law that if STATE fails to assert and plead the existence of the governing subject matter of “transportation” and its elements in the complaint and charging instrument(s), the court’s jurisdiction is never invoked, and no justiciable issue exists before it.

In fact, Respondent has reason to believe and does believe that the making of false and unsubstantiated assertions of fact in a criminal complaint that a “transportation” offense has allegedly been committed by Respondent or any other similarly situated individual, while failing to assert within the body of the complaint and charging instrument(s) the necessary elements of both an actual “crime” and that the Accused was engaged in “transportation” at the time, and then proceeding to file that complaint and charging instrument in a court, is actually a crime of SIMULATING LEGAL PROCESS under §32.48, Penal Code.

The facts and law supporting Respondent’s assertions and allegations herein should be obvious to even the most basically educated layperson, much less to an actual attorney or judge. Respondent can be a “driver” or “operator” only if Respondent is actually engaging in the regulated subject matter activity of “transportation,” just as an automobile or other conveyance legally becomes a “device” that can then be defined as a “commercial/ motor/ vehicle/ motorcycle/ moped” only when being “used” by a “driver” or “operator” to engage in “transportation,” which s/he could only do while also acting as a “carrier” that is “operating” a business for “compensation or hire.”

For the prosecution or the court to mutually argue and conclude that it is completely unnecessary to allege and prove that Respondent or any other similarly situated individual was actually engaged in “transportation” as an element of the alleged offense, is to argue that each and every one of these subordinate legal terms, phrases, objects, devices, procedures, and ancillary subjects, objects, and offenses, are somehow completely independent and totally unrelated and irrelevant to the legislatively mandated subject matter of “transportation,” thus, they are denying all the readily available facts, law, logic, and reason, in a manner that spits in the proverbial face of the one subject provision of Art. 3, §35, Texas Constitution.

Furthermore, as the engaging in of the regulated subject matter activity of “transportation” is entirely voluntary, it follows that an individual must so engage willfully and knowingly, and not accidentally and without intent. Thus, the statutory scheme would almost certainly fail the “vague and ambiguous” test in that it not does not define the individual terms of either “transportation” or “carrier.” But, it would also fail constitutional and common law due process muster in that the voluntary, knowing and willful nature of engaging in the regulated activity of “transportation” would actually require the statutory scheme to include both mens rea and corpus delicti elements in the offense rather than simply being a “strict liability” statute where the Accused’s actual activity, state of mind, and intent, are not considered and required to be issues relevant to the elements of the charge. Thus, in Respondent’s opinion, making any such allegation of an offense a wholly unconstitutional and unlawful Bill of Pains and Penalties.

No court can change these facts, no matter how it may rule, as that would be tantamount to not only legislating from the bench, but also singlehandedly altering the very foundational basis of all criminal law since the beginning of the time of man. And no executive action could do it for not only these same reasons, but also because any executive actions must comply with the law as written, as long as the person(s) in the executive department believe the law to be completely constitutional, which, if they did not, they would have a duty to refuse to enforce it at all or personally suffer the consequences for doing so.

 

No Articulable Probable Cause.

Texas – A “traffic stop” for the purpose of issuing a “transportation” citations will almost ALWAYS lack reasonable suspicion and articulable probable cause. And here is why….

If an officer cannot articulate specific factual elements or produce prima facie evidence that an individual was or is actively engaged in “transportation,” then how is it possible for the officer to just skip over ‘reasonable suspicion’ and go directly to ‘probable cause’ to believe that a crime under the “transportation” code has actually been, is being, or is about to be, committed? Especially considering that such criminality is created and exists solely under a malum prohibitum statutory scheme that relates solely to regulating “transportation” and activities that are directly subordinate and ancillary thereto?

Upon what specific articulable facts must an officer first base ‘reasonable suspicion’ that an individual is engaging in “transportation” in order to reach the necessary level of ‘probable cause’ to allege criminal activity, for it is one thing to inherently understand that criminality exists when an act is itself morally wrong and unjustifiable, while also being readily identifiable as having harmed another individual or their property. Acts such as fraud, theft, assault, or murder are some examples of such acts.

However, in a malum prohibitum statutory scheme that is strictly regulatory in its general nature, such criminality is neither morally wrong nor necessarily unjustifiable, and, more often than not, involves no actual victim complaining of palpable injury to their person or property. Therefore, Respondent asserts that the common standard for ‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘probable cause’ is not sufficient in such cases, in that the naked unsubstantiated claim of either would suffice to provide an officer with far more opportunity and latitude for abuse of his or her authority and in depriving individuals of their rights against unreasonable searches and seizures as well as due process. The result being that the defining elements necessary to make a malum prohibitum allegation of criminality now rests solely in the subjective opinion and determinations of the officer alone, and not within the statutory scheme that defines and controls it.

And unlike other forms of malum prohibitum statutory schemes, such as possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia, where it is the possession itself that is the criminal act, and which requires at least some reasonable indicator or facts that the person was in possession of same, how is this to be accomplished when the act itself is simply regulatory and there are no articulable facts that lead to the Governing Subject Matter being regulated? How does an officer come to have ‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘probable cause’ to suspect or believe that a regulatory offense that is completely ancillary and subordinate only to the regulated Governing Subject Matter of “transportation,” is being, has been, or is about to be committed, without any articulable facts or evidence that “transportation” was or is being engaged in?

For instance, how does an officer look at a family minivan traveling down the highway and reach the conclusion that the mother-of-three inside the van is actually a “carrier” secretly engaged in the business of transporting passengers, goods, or property from one place to another for compensation or hire? Even if an officer began with the premise that the minivan was ‘speeding,’ at what point is the officer required to actually investigate the existence of facts and evidence necessary to establish and prove that “transportation” is a factual element of the ancillary regulatory offense being alleged? Despite the fact that there actually is not any offense whatsoever that is defined as “speeding” within the “Transportation” Code, the presumption of such an offense is based entirely upon the statutes within that code as being a regulated activity subordinate and ancillary to the Governing Subject Matter of “transportation,” not just “speeding” in and of itself. “Speeding” is not the primary regulated subject matter, “transportation” is, hence, an individual can be “speeding” only if it can first be proven that they were actively engaged in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

Which begs the question, is the officer, the prosecutor, and the court, allowed to simply presume the existence of “transportation” for the purpose of a criminal prosecution, even though there are no facts or evidence that this essential element of the offense even exists? Isn’t this lack of evidence for the existence of the primary element of the offense necessarily exculpatory[1] to the accused individual by default? Isn’t the prosecutor required as a matter of right and law to disclose that lack of evidence and dismiss the case rather than simply presuming the existence of “transportation” and seeking to prosecute anyway (see footnote 9 ibid)? Isn’t this prime element of the existence of “transportation” the sole basis for the court having jurisdiction of the matter in the first instance considering that the subordinate and ancillary regulatory offense is no crime at all without it?

In relation to an offense that is entirely malum prohibitum under a regulatory statute, how could an officer possibly get to ‘probable cause’ without actual knowledge and understanding of all the specific elements of the alleged offense codified by the statutory scheme? Does the officer need only one out of three statutory elements that have to be proven, or is it just four out of five, or perhaps seven out of ten? Is it possible that an officer cannot reach probable cause in such cases without being able to express facts proving the existence of all elements required to be proven, beginning with proof that “transportation” was being engaged in at the time of the alleged offense? And if not, then how is such a standard not entirely capricious, arbitrary and subjective, and, thus, completely unconstitutional in relation to an individual’s right of due process and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, not to mention the unreasonably increased danger to their property and/or person by overzealous or abusive public servants?

Respondent asserts that such ‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘probable cause’ simply cannot be reasonably or objectively obtained in instances where an offense is defined and governed entirely by statutory schemes as a malum prohibitum offense using the present standards established by the courts when applied to the private “non-transportation” activities of the general public.



Footnotes:

[1] Art. 2.01. DUTIES OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. Each district attorney shall represent the State in all criminal cases in the district courts of his district and in appeals therefrom, except in cases where he has been, before his election, employed adversely. When any criminal proceeding is had before an examining court in his district or before a judge upon habeas corpus, and he is notified of the same, and is at the time within his district, he shall represent the State therein, unless prevented by other official duties. It shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys, including any special prosecutors, not to convict, but to see that justice is done. They shall not suppress facts or secrete witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused.

Challenging Jurisdiction Based on Citations & Complaints in Texas Justice and Municpal Courts (“Transportation”)

Have you ever had a justice or municipal court in Texas tell you that they didn’t actually need a signed and verified criminal complaint in order to have jurisdiction to conduct their sham proceedings against you?  Did you buy it hook, line, and sinker, or did you feel or know that they were as full of shit as a colostomy bag attached to a fat man at a buffet? If it was the latter, congratulations, you aren’t really as stupid overall as you were probably made to feel at the time.

However, the reason that you were made to feel stupid and powerless was because in a particular way, you were.  You weren’t educated or prepared for the bullshit games they like to play in these courts, which can be best described only as a form of judicial three card monte, “Where’s your rights! C’mon, follow your rights! Are they on the left, right, the middle? C’mon, choose and show me!

Well, in this article I am attempting to provide you with some information that should help you, provided you make the effort to actually help yourself by learning it. What you are about to read is easily verified using the State of Texas’ own legislative web site. On this site are all the codes and the Texas Constitution that are referenced in this article.

http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/

All you have to do is learn what they are, where they are, and how to argue what you know about them from doing so. This article is about how to make and integrate those arguments into a legal pleading, whether that pleading demands a dismissal, or is challenging the courts jurisdiction, or challenging the form and substance of a complaint or charging instrument, and, thus, challenging its actual validity for the intended purpose. In relation to these lower courts and class of cases, a citation and complaint are all you will normally have to contend with and fully understand the proper procedural requirements and usages of.  This is constitutionally improper in this author’s opinion, but what can you expect when you are dealing with a collection of attorneys that actually believe they are fundamentally more intellectual, intelligent, and wiser than everyone else.



SB 971 (“Transportation” Code) Prosecutions Will Always Fail Due Process Muster

Respondent’s Challenge to Citation as a Valid Charging Instrument

Rationally speaking, due to numerous violations of Respondent’s right of due process and legal conflicts both with those due process rights and other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, neither the citation nor the complaint in this matter are legally sufficient in and of themselves to invest the court with jurisdiction.

The citation suffers from multiple legal conflicts in that it does not meet all of the mandatory statutory requirements of a valid complaint pursuant §45.019(a), Code of Criminal Procedure, nor does there exist any waiver mutually agreed upon and signed by the Accused and the alleged Attorney for the State that has been submitted to the court pursuant § 27.14(d), Code of Criminal Procedure, yet another legal conflict. This waiver is mandatory before the court is authorized to use a citation in lieu of a valid verified complaint, and there is no such waiver signed by Respondent.

The citation also suffers from multiple conflicts with Respondent’s right of due process; the citation is not in any way signed and verified; the citation does not contain the required legal language intended to provide proper, sufficient, and timely notice to an accused individual of the specific allegations being made against them; the citation does not and is not required to state all of the legal elements required to be proven for each allegation made upon its face; the allegations made on the face of a citation may or may not be the same as those stated in an actual criminal complaint.

Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has long ago (unconstitutionally) set the minimum bar investing jurisdiction in justice and municipal courts to the actual filing of a sworn complaint. An opinion which Respondent would argue is also unconstitutional and illegal on its face pursuant both Art. 5, §12(b), Texas Constitution, and §1.05, Code of Criminal Procedure. Leaving the only logical conclusion to the issue be that, for the moment, anything less than a signed and verified criminal complaint is a failure to provide proper, sufficient and timely notice to Respondent, which, in turn, is a complete denial of substantive and procedural due process rights. Thus, the citation alone is consistently repudiated by mandatory requirements of a constitutional, statutory, and due process nature that make it legally insufficient to ever invoke a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Respondent’s Challenge to the  Form, Substance, Constitutional, and Statutory Insufficiencies of the Criminal Complaint as a Valid Charging Instrument

For the purpose of clarification and brevity in the following discussion on the related statutory impact to criminal complaints, Respondent must establish common points of reference in relation to certain terminology that will be used throughout.

“Regulated Subject Matter” shall mean the regulated occupation of “transportation” as specifically stated and intended by the Texas Legislature in the Bill Caption of SB 971 as contextually pertaining and relevant to the entirety of the “Transportation Code,” the Bill Caption being “AN ACT relating to the adoption of a nonsubstantive revision of statutes relating to transportation, including conforming amendments, repeals, and penalties.[1] (Emphasis added)

“Transportation” [2] shall have the same meaning as is found in Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition “The movement of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier. Interstate Commerce Com’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S.Ct. 1125, 38 L.Ed. 1047.

“Carrier” [3] shall have the same meaning as is found in Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition “Individual or organization engaged in transporting passengers or goods for hire. “Carrier” means any person engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by land, as a common, contract, or private carrier, or freight forwarder as those terms are used in the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, and officers, agents and employees of such carriers. 18 U.S.C.A. § 831.

“Alleged Attorney for the State” shall mean any attorney practicing in this state that is neither a properly elected or appointed and duly sworn County or District Attorney pursuant all requirements for same as mandated by the Texas Constitution, or that is not directly employed thereby as a full-time Assistant County or District Attorney acting under the constitutionally delegated lawful authority of that office. The term shall include, but is not limited to, any city/municipal attorney or any attorney in private practice acting under contract or other form of agreement with any city, town, village, municipality or county.

As to the complaint itself, it cannot be reasonably asserted or argued that the complaint contains the required legal language intended to provide proper, sufficient, and timely notice to an accused individual of the allegations being made against them as there is no legal requirement in statute for a criminal complaint created under either §§15.05 or 45.019(a), Code of Criminal Procedure, to state all of the legal elements required to be proven for each allegation made upon its face, which itself is a violation of Respondent’s right of due process.

The complaint is legally insufficient and violates Respondent’s right of due process as it does not state any facts alleging or relating to the Regulated Subject Matter under which the alleged failure to perform a legal duty actually exists, which Respondent Exhibit “A” very clearly states is that of “transportation.” Respondent submits that the entire Regulated Subject Matter of SB 971 exists solely to regulate the underlying activities and functions directly associated with engaging in the commercial/economic occupation of “transportation,” and in no way whatsoever was it intended or enacted for the purpose of placing the individual rights and private property of the People under the STATE’s presumptive regulatory and licensing authority via the ‘police power.’

Thus, the prosecution and the court are attempting to invoke subject matter and in personam jurisdiction not through actual facts and evidence proving such jurisdiction, but through an unconstitutional application of analytically backward progressing inferences based entirely on an initial irrebuttable presumption, i.e. “The STATE accuses Respondent of “driving” a “motor vehicle” in violation of specific and multiple sections of the “transportation” code, which regulates only “transportation,” which is a term with a specific legal and industry applicable meaning of which we claim or pretend to have no actual knowledge or understanding. But, considering that we did no actual investigation into, and have no actual facts or evidence to support, the entirely presumptive claim that Respondent was actually engaging in the Regulated Subject Matter of “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense, we will fabricate the illusory presumption needed by using statutorily related terminology that is otherwise only legally applicable to such activity, thus fabricating an offense that legally could and would apply only if Respondent were so engaged.”

It cannot be overstated that the complaint (or any other existing charging instrument) contains no assertion of evidentiary elements and facts relating to Respondent actively engaging in the Regulated Subject Matter of “transportation,” because there are none! And the Alleged Attorney for the State could have known and should have known that there is no subject matter creating a legal duty upon Respondent without them and the necessary admissible evidence to prove them. Any and all other facts alleged in the complaint(s) are themselves nothing more than subordinate criteria legally and logically existing only as directly subordinate subject matter components to the primary subject matter under which they are codified within SB 971, that of “transportation.”

It should be axiomatic that without evidentiary proof that Respondent was engaging in the overall parent subject matter, any alleged violation of a strictly subordinate legal duty thereunder cannot legally exist or stand as binding upon Respondent absent factual consideration and evidence that s/he was actively engaging in “transportation.” The regulated activity of “transportation” alone is the primary subject matter governing the alleged violation, and its existence must be asserted in the complaint and proven upon the record of the court in order for both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction to be invested in the court, because jurisdiction is invested in such courts only when an offense against a public duty directly related to that specific subject matter activity can be proven on the record.

Respondent can fathom only four possible means by which the STATE could even hope to provide evidence that s/he was actively engaged in the Regulated Subject Matter of “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense. Such evidence would necessarily be comprised of either a bill of lading, a passenger manifest, a commercial logbook, or a signed confession. All of which would be required to show specific facts proving that Respondent was actively engaged in “transportation” at the time. Absent this evidence STATE’s entire case is not merely circumstantial, it is entirely presumptive and legally unsubstantiated, and, therefore, is nothing less than a kangaroo court conducting kangaroo proceedings that violate Respondents fundamental rights of due process by attempting to convict him/her of a crime based solely on presumption, inference, and speculation, without a single piece of factual evidence supporting any of it.

The constitutionally required Caption found on Page 1 of SB 971 provides Respondent with all the necessary evidence to reasonably conclude that the Legislature’s sole intent upon enacting SB 971 was to regulate the commercial occupation known as “transportation,” and only those subjects, objects, and activities necessarily subordinate and ancillary thereto, and nothing else. There is also ample indication within multiple subordinate subject matter provisions of the Bill itself that its only intended nature and application was that of regulating commercial use of the public highways for the general safety of the traveling public, for whom the highways are built and used for their own private business and pleasure as a matter of fundamental right.

However, this readily available and easily understandable evidence has done nothing to prevent every law enforcement agency and court throughout Texas from unconstitutionally and illegally attempting to expand SB 971’s very limited intended application to everyone and everything upon our Texas highways under the ever growing cancerous tumor upon freedom and liberty that is the ‘police power,’ regardless of the fact that a great many of the People unlawfully and illegally subjected to its punitive measures via executive and judicial harassment and outright corruption have no legal duty under any provision of SB 971, as it never applied to them or Respondent in any way absent evidentiary proof of engaging in “transportation” at the time of the alleged offense.

In short, as the moving party in the instant matter, the STATE lawfully and legally bears the full burden of proving every element of an allegation. In this particular case, an allegation that as a matter of law must begin with proof that Respondent was actively engaged in the subject matter regulated occupation of “transportation.” Only after that fact is established by submission of at least one of the aforementioned pieces of evidence, can the STATE attempt to prove that Respondent was acting in the legal capacity of a compensated “carrier,” or simultaneously as both a compensated “carrier” and “operator/driver,” or even as a compensated “operator/driver” employed by a “carrier.”

Therefore, it is only after establishing that Respondent was actively engaged in “transportation” that the STATE can legally attempt to prove that was Respondent was in physical control of a “motor vehicle,” as the term “motor vehicle” is only applicable when the device is being actively used by an “operator” or “driver” to engage in the Regulated Subject Matter that is the commercial occupation of “transportation.” Respondent’s private fundamental right to liberty through locomotion and travel for his/her own personal business and pleasure, or for the purpose of moving his own person or property upon the highways as a matter of right, does not constitute engaging in “transportation” as that subject matter was intended to be regulated by SB 971.

Finally, there is no actual constitutionally compliant charging instrument investing this court with jurisdiction in the required form of an indictment or information as required by Art. 5, §§12(b) and 17 of the Texas Constitution, as well as §§2.04 and 2.05, Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein an information is required to be prepared and filed in any misdemeanor case, in any court within any county where there exists a County Attorney. Respondent can find no such instrument in the court record.

Furthermore, the current case law on the subject of pursuing prosecutions in municipal and justice courts by complaint alone has failed at every turn to examine the clearly stated requirements of §§2.04 and 2.05, Code of Criminal Procedure, and integrate them into its judicial opinions. Which is extremely odd and telling as both of these articles have been mandatory procedural law since enacted by the 59th Legislature in 1965.

Thus, Respondent can only conclude that this decades old ongoing failure of every level of our Texas Courts to fully comply with lawfully enacted provisions governing criminal procedure is knowing and willful subversion in order to facilitate the process of speedier prosecutions at the expense of proper jurisdictional and due process requisites, meaning that the courts have decided that they now have the power to both ignore legislatively enacted procedures for criminal cases as well as to rewrite those processes to work however the courts themselves please. Respondent is left wondering if the Texas Supreme Court would have a problem with defending such behavior if the issue were raised in a lawsuit over the multitude of unlawful and illegal due process and jurisdictional issues it creates.



Footnotes:

[1] Respondent Exhibit “A” – Texas Secretary of State Certified copy of Page 1, Bill Caption SB 971, 74th Legislature, 1995.

[2] At no time did the Texas Legislature see fit to statutorily define the term “transportation” within SB 971, the current amended version of the “Transportation” Code, or any other statutory code in the entirety of Texas legislation. Therefore, under the rules of statutory interpretation and construction, Respondent has supplied the common legal definition as currently utilized and applicable to the areas of related law and industry.

[3] As with the term “transportation,” the Texas Legislature did not see fit to statutorily define the singular term “carrier” within SB 971 or the current amended version of the “Transportation” Code. The closest defined phrase is “motor carrier” within §643.001(6). Therefore, under the rules of statutory interpretation and construction, Respondent has supplied the common legal definition as currently utilized and applicable to the areas of related law and industry.



I hope that this gives you some idea of what is being done to you and how.  I hope even more that it pisses you off to such a degree that you will fight every ticket you receive for the rest of your living days upon this Earth, and that you will make it your mission in that life to convince everyone you know or meet to do the same. Because, if everyone did, the entire system that has foisted this unconstitutional scheme of regulatory theft upon us all would collapse under its own financial weight within a matter of weeks or days.

Opening of Motion for Constitutional Challenge of SB 971 (Transportation Code)

Discussion

Due order of pleadings.

This Special Appearance is accompanied by Respondent’s Waiver of Right to Representation, his/her Formal Declination to Plea, and his/her Objection to Round-Robin Processing. While a ruling on “due order of pleadings” would be helpful, sufficient is the fact that in the event this one must be considered filed first, it is submitted with the other “first filings” in this case.

Reservation of additional objections.

Should a properly formed and fully substantive “complaint” ever exist, and should STATE ever satisfy its Due Process burden by serving such “complaint,” Respondent reserves the right to supplement this motion should there be defect, error, or irregularity with such “complaint.”

Respondent asserts the fundamental right to
challenge the jurisdiction of this court.

“Take all the robes of all the good judges that have ever
lived on the face of the earth, and they would not be
large enough to cover the iniquity of one corrupt judge.”
― Henry Ward Beecher

Respondent invokes §1.02, Code of Criminal Procedure (“The procedure herein prescribed shall govern all criminal proceedings … insofar as are applicable.”) for the purpose of filing this “Special Appearance,” pursuant Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 120a for the express purpose of challenging this court’s subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, as there is no specific provision or procedure for such jurisdictional challenges within the Code of Criminal Procedure, making those procedures inapplicable for such purpose.

Respondent vehemently and belligerently objects to this court of limited jurisdiction asserting a presupposed and irrebuttable presumption of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction where no evidence of such jurisdiction appears upon the record of the court. And Respondent further objects to any attempt by this court of limited jurisdiction to deny him/her in the right to challenge the court’s own mere presumption of jurisdiction rather than actual jurisdiction properly established and invoked by the filing of proper pleadings and evidence as presented by the alleged Attorney for the State proving the court’s subject matter and in personam jurisdiction upon the record.

Furthermore, “Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal.Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. 1993) (emphasis added). Which concept lies at the heart of Respondent’s own legal maxim “Challenge jurisdiction once, always, and forever.

Therefore, the sitting judge in this matter has no authority whatsoever to deny Respondent in the right to challenge the court’s presumption of jurisdiction or the constitutionality of any statutory scheme or regulatory code that would deprive the court of subject matter or in personam jurisdiction, presuming the court ever properly acquired jurisdiction at all.

Thus, Respondent presumes the court judicially competent enough so as to be well aware of the legal and civil consequences and liabilities affixed to any judge choosing to proceed in the prosecution of any matter whatsoever without proper jurisdiction, much less with no jurisdiction at all. [1]

Prelude.

“The more corrupt the state, the more laws.”
― Publius Cornelius Tacitus

Respondent asks indulgence for the length of this Motion, but one can hardly expect that a single person forced against their will to live in a multi-level dwelling with an inordinately large number of exterior doors and windows could manage to close them all in a brief moment at the approaching of a storm. A storm such as the one Respondent sees forming on the horizon in response to this Motion.

This inordinately large number of windows and doors is representative of the enormous hodge-podge of poorly researched, analyzed, understood, reasoned, and even more poorly decided court opinions on the various impositions and offenses that exist within the Governing Subject Matter of “transportation” pursuant the alleged enactment of Senate Bill 971 by the 74th Legislature in 1995 (“SB 971”) as the then newly recodified Texas “transportation” code (see infra page 12 “Alleged Purpose of SB 971s Enactment”).

In fact, the overall collection of Texas court opinions relating to cases where members of the general public were charged with and ‘convicted’ of alleged offenses relating to the Governing Subject Matter of “transportation,” which is clearly set forth and established as the legal purpose and intent of the 74th Texas Legislature within the Title of SB 971, are so poorly analyzed and legally inept in light of the crystal clear provisions of both the Constitution of the State of Texas 1876 (“Texas Constitution”) and legislatively stated intent, that Respondent has to wonder why it is even called a “law degree,” or why one is allegedly even needed in order to practice law in the first place. Each would seem a fair question, as the majority of these cases show more than mere traces or passing glimmers of knowing and willful legal deception and trickery carefully crafted into a believable façade by intentional prosecutorial misdirection of facts and statute blended and patched by clear-cut judicial obfuscation of the underlying facts and law. It is just as Will Rogers said, “Make crime pay. Become a lawyer.

Regardless of their poor legal basis and reasoning, however, every one of these cases is an open door or window through which the STATE and/or this court may seek to escape as a means of avoiding making a constitutionally compliant final ruling on the unconstitutionality alleged in this matter. Therefore, Respondent does not intend to leave open a single one if at all possible. Respondent has no intention of dealing with each specific case individually, but it is imperative that it be understood from the beginning that they all were and are required to conform to the legislative intent of SB 971 where any provision thereof was not previously legislatively or judicially invalidated, which very few of these cases, if any, actually do in either of these regards. And as Respondent shall also show, the certified documents leave no question in that the Title of SB 971 plainly states that the Governing Subject Matter of the Bill, and thus any subject matter jurisdiction to be invested in a court, was and is limited solely to cases specifically involvingtransportation.”

So, buckle up, for the storm is now upon you, and lo’, upon it’s back rides Thor, the Norse god of Thunder, and in this writing, the might of his hammer he doth wield.

Respondent’s Challenge Summary – The Making of Thor’s Hammer.

“Hell is empty and all the devils are here.”
― William Shakespeare, The Tempest

We begin our revelation under the pervasive freedom obscuring gray cloud of governmental lies, deceit, intrigue and corruption, for Shakespeare was correct, not only are the Devils already here, but they are surreptitiously subverting our very lives by what is hidden deep within the details of their legal constructs. Details that have lain carefully buried and hidden by knowing and corrupt minds and hands. That is, buried and hidden until the coming of this Motion Respondent has aptly chosen to unofficially title “Thor’s Hammer.”

Salvation of our individual rights involves discovery of factual truth, which will be achieved through the revelation of three existing and constitutionally unlawful conditions. Conditions by which the rights, liberties, and fundamental freedoms of not only Respondent, but the whole of the People of Texas, are being eroded and destroyed by our own servant government in ways that can no longer be allowed to continue or remain intact. It is time to exorcise the Devils from our lives and back to the Hell in which they rightfully belong.

This discovery of truth involves two primary issues, one constitutional (“Primary Constitutional Issue”) and one legal (“Primary Legal Issue”), the latter issue being divided into two parts Unconstitutional Interpretation and Unconstitutional Application.

The Primary Constitutional Issue being that the alleged 1995 enactment of Senate Bill 971 (“SB 971”), by the 74th Legislature, most commonly referred to as the recodified “transportation” act/code, was perpetrated in direct violation of specific provisions of the Texas Constitution that are intended to apply clear restrictions and other controls upon legislative actions and procedures relating to the creation and passing of all constitutionally valid Texas law.

In the particular case of SB 971, this Primary Constitutional Issue relies upon facts and information contained within copies of specific pertinent pages of SB 971 as certified by the office of the Texas Secretary of State (“certified copy/ copies/ document/ documents, Page 1/ 2160/ 2161, Section 28, Signature Page”), copies of which Respondent has attached to this Motion for evidentiary inspection. These certified copies provide prima facie evidence that knowing and willful acts of sedition, treason, and fraud were engaged in and perpetrated by as-of-yet unknown members of the 74th Legislature during the alleged 1995 enactment of SB 971. And are documented evidence that SB 971 is a complete and total authoritarian fraud willfully perpetrated upon the Public. The certified documents prove the existence of knowingly subversive acts that were then and are now direct violations of Art. 3, §§32 and 62, of the Texas Constitution, and virtually the entire set of individual rights and protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights under Art. 1 of same. These subversive and treasonous acts must have been knowingly and willfully perpetrated by someone in the 74th Legislature having the power to do so. And when coupled with the numerous demonstrably fundamental rights violating provisions of SB 971 itself, are so egregiously unconstitutional and fraudulent as to shock the conscience. The degree of seditious fraud involved requires nothing less than that the entirety of SB 971, and all subsequent legislative amendments thereto, be declared unconstitutional ab initio and void of any force and effect of law pursuant Art. 1, §29 and Art. 3, §32, Texas Constitution.

The first part of the Primary Legal Issue is that SB 971 is knowingly and willfully given an illegal Unconstitutional Interpretation by the judicial and executive departments of Texas Government. They are interpreting legislative intent based not upon the stated intent within the Bill Title of SB 971 itself, the very basis of the entire “transportation” code, but upon the constantly shifting sands that are the statutory revisions made entirely by the Statutory Revision Committee.[2] This Unconstitutional Interpretation proclaims that the entirety of SB 971, in the form of the “transportation” code, is wholly applicable to the lives, property and activities of the People of Texas when they are acting entirely within their private individual capacities, and while engaging in the free exercise and enjoyment of their inherent fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, including that of liberty through locomotion, see supra page EEC99.

The second part of the Primary Legal Issue also relies upon the same aforementioned certified copies as prima facie evidence that, even if SB 971 had been enacted constitutionally, which Respondent adamantly believes and belligerently asserts that the certified documents prove it absolutely was not, it absolutely is and always has been knowingly and willfully misapplied to the general public in a completely unconstitutional and legislatively unintended manner, making such application illegal for any purpose, and this illegal application was ongoing even prior to its alleged 1995 recodification via SB 971 from the original collection of acts codified in Vernon’s Civil Statutes. And this unlawful and legislatively unintended application was and is still being utilized by state and local governmental actors to deprive the sovereign People of the Texas Republic, of which Respondent is one, of virtually every constitutional protection to which we are inherently fundamentally and rightfully entitled as well as every statutory protection afforded us to which we are equally entitled.

Furthermore, this patently fraudulent and unconstitutional application of SB 971 to both Respondent and the general public is used to facilitate the demonstrably specious and disingenuous claim that the People’s private use of the public roads by automobile or other motor/engine driven conveyances, while traveling in their private capacities for their own personal business and pleasure, is somehow subject to the regulatory provisions of SB 971 and its later amendments. And further, that SB 971 created a regulatory scheme allegedly subjecting Respondent and the general public to a legal duty requiring them to apply for and obtain numerous licenses and other accouterments specifically relating solely to the Governing Subject Matter of “transportation,” an occupation which Respondent was not, is not, and has never engaged.



Footnotes:

[1] “When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost.” Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326.

[2] Sec. 1.001. PURPOSE OF CODE.

(a) This code is enacted as a part of the state’s continuing statutory revision program, begun by the Texas Legislative Council in 1963 as directed by the legislature in the law codified as Section 323.007, Government Code. The program contemplates a topic-by-topic revision of the state’s general and permanent statute law without substantive change.

(b) Consistent with the objectives of the statutory revision program, the purpose of this code is to make the law encompassed by this code more accessible and understandable by:

(1) rearranging the statutes into a more logical order;

(2) employing a format and numbering system designed to facilitate citation of the law and to accommodate future expansion of the law;

(3) eliminating repealed, duplicative, unconstitutional, expired, executed, and other ineffective provisions; and

(4) restating the law in modern American English to the greatest extent possible.

Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 165, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.

 

Texas “Transportation” Code Recodification Bill SB971 74th Legis. 1995

This is the original Bill that was, pursuant Texas  Constitution, Article 3, Secs. 29-40 and 62, unconstitutionally voted into law by the 74th Legislature in 1995.

The emergency clause used to suspend the reading of the bill on the floor of each house over three several days can be read on page 4163 of the PDF. The only reason this could have possibly been done was to pass the bill as quickly as possible in order to hide the substantive changes that the public was being told had NOT been made in the recodification. The emergency clause used to suspend this procedural rule directly violates Art. 3, Sec. 62, as to how and when the legislature has lawful authority to suspend certain procedural rules, which includes, but is not limited to, the reading of all bills on the floor of each house over three several days and open discussion held thereon before that Bill would ever have the force and effect of law.

After reading both page 6143 of the Bill and Art. Sec. 62, you will see that it is not even remotely possible to claim that Sec. 62 was followed. Furthermore, if Art. 3, Sec. 62, Texas Constitution was NOT followed, then, anything created in violation of it is automatically void pursuant Art. 1, Sec. 29, Texas Constitution.

Thus the entire “transportation” code recodification is unconstitutional under the provisions of the Texas Constitution.

Transp Code Non-Subst Recode SB971_74R (Emergency Clause p 4163)

No Matter WHAT the Courts Tell You, County and Municipal Ordinances ARE NOT Binding Public Law!!

I am giving away these two chapters of my second book simply because the information in the second attached chapter relating to ordinances is so wide-spread and pervasive in every single Union State.

Please read them carefully and compare what is written to your own sovereign state’s constitution and see if you notice the same irregularities in what your pretend representatives have been doing to you for the last several decades of deceit and betrayal in which they have all engaged at some point or other.

It works very much like the “good cop” problem, there are no “good cops” because they won’t arrest and charge the bad ones out of self-preservation for their own careers.  And no less is true of the politicians you have allowed to occupy your public offices. Even when things are done that violate law, ethics, morality, and the constitutional prohibitions making it unlawful, they do nothing to expose and call out their corrupt fellows to be held publicly accountable.

Screw the ‘thin blue line,’ the ‘code of silence,’ and the ‘chain of command’ if any or all of them require or allow corruption and abuse of power and authority to win the day over right and justice. Don’t any of you dare stand there and call your actions or inactions ‘good’ when you see evil things being perpetrated and do nothing to stop, prevent, or publicly expose it just so you don’t risk losing a paycheck. Nothing is more pathetic and hypocritical than that.

What I have written about here is everything that we are all having to experience and survive in our modern police state and over-regulated society and way of living, and it needs to stop. But only by knowing and educating others can we hope to do that. So please, take the time to read what is contained in the attached document, especially if you are an attorney or personally know one that would appreciate the information (good luck on that one….).

I was asked about how to respond to a notice of some alleged ordinance violation in some city here in Texas, and so I thought I would present an answer for the edification of all, regardless of your state republic. READ your state constitutions and Bill of Rights people! It was put there for a REASON, and only YOU can enforce it for yourself. But first, you have to know what is there and how it ties into the few things that you actually authorized your public servants to do!

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Ordinances are NOT and CANNOT be enforced as public law in Texas. Check your individual state constitutions on exactly to WHOM the power to create binding public law was delegated. That body CANNOT re-delegate that power unless the state constitution specifically authorizes it to do so, or individually empowers some other office to create binding public law for some specific purpose.

NOWHERE does the Texas Constitution authorize ANY OTHER body to create public law outside of the Texas Legislature. In fact, the term ordinance appears exactly ONCE each in Arts. 9 (counties) and 11 (municipalities). And NEITHER time is it addressed as being LAW or binding upon the public as such.

In fact, any such action would be a direct violation of the Texas Constitution. How do we know this? We READ!!

Within Art. 11, Sec. 5 we find the following “The adoption or amendment of charters is subject to such limitations as may be prescribed by the Legislature, AND NO CHARTER OR ANY ORDINANCE PASSED UNDER SAID CHARTER SHALL CONTAIN ANY PROVISION INCONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.”

In other words, Art. 11, Sec. 5, Texas Constitution, specifically FORBIDS a municipality from granting themselves the power to MAKE any binding public law. Nor can the legislature delegate such power to them or authorize any such powers through a statutory scheme. This is precisely why I assert that ordinances can be binding upon ONLY those ‘persons’ internally employed by, contracted with, authorized/created by, or that knowingly and willingly consent to being bound by such acts.

In Art. 3, Secs. 1 and 2 we read this:

“Sec. 1. SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. The Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, which together shall be styled “The Legislature of the State of Texas.”

Sec. 2. MEMBERSHIP OF SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. The Senate shall consist of thirty-one members. The House of Representatives shall consist of 150 members. ”

Does a city council meet ANY of these criteria as the constitutionally designated public law-making body in Texas? Just in case you’re reading this and are one of those Statist libtards with below average reading and comprehension skills, the definitive answer is FUCK NO, they DO NOT!!

Again, how do we argue that this is the case and make it stick? The same way we did before, we READ!

In Art. 3, Secs. 1 and 2 we read this:

“Sec. 19. INELIGIBILITY OF PERSONS HOLDING OTHER OFFICES. NO judge of any court, Secretary of State, Attorney General, clerk of any court of record, or any PERSON HOLDING A LUCRATIVE OFFICE UNDER the United States, or THIS STATE, or any foreign government SHALL DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE IS ELECTED OR APPOINTED, BE ELIGIBLE TO THE LEGISLATURE.”

So, if we paraphrase it down to its essence, we can plainly read:

“Sec. 19. INELIGIBILITY OF PERSONS HOLDING OTHER OFFICES. NO … PERSON HOLDING A LUCRATIVE OFFICE UNDER … THIS STATE, … SHALL DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE IS ELECTED OR APPOINTED, BE ELIGIBLE TO THE LEGISLATURE.”

So, if a municipal attorney wants to argue over it, we do it this way:

1) By what form of official mechanism did the members of the [CITY NAME] city council obtain their individual offices?

2) If they are elected to their office, and are allegedly functioning as a political subdivision thereof, i.e. as state actors performing official state acts, then why are you arguing that they are NOT a “PERSON HOLDING A LUCRATIVE OFFICE UNDER … THIS STATE,” and, thus, are ineligible to be sitting in the Texas Legislature at the same time they are sitting as paid members of the city council?

3) Okay, I agree then that they are NOT acting as members of the Legislature nor are they acting under ANY constitutionally delegated state authority when acting solely as members of the [CITY NAME] city council for the purposes of THIS ordinance, therefore, it would be constitutionally impossible for it to have the force and effect of binding public law as that power is delegated ONLY to the Texas Legislature, who CANNOT re-delegate it to someone else through legislation pursuant Art. 1, Sec. 29 of the Texas Constitution within the People’s, meaning MY PERSONAL, Bill of Rights.

Sec. 29. PROVISIONS OF BILL OF RIGHTS EXCEPTED FROM POWERS OF GOVERNMENT; TO FOREVER REMAIN INVIOLATE. To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare that everything in this “Bill of Rights” is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall be void.

4) Does the alleged ordinance enactment fully comply and comport with Art. 3, Sec. 29 of the Texas Constitution and remain inviolate of Art. 1, Sec. 29 of the Bill of Rights within same?

Sec. 29. ENACTING CLAUSE OF LAWS. The enacting clause of all laws shall be: “Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Texas.”

5) Does the alleged ordinance enactment fully comply and comport with Art. 3, Sec. 30 of the Texas Constitution and remain inviolate of Art. 1, Sec. 29 of the Bill of Rights within same?

Sec. 30. LAWS PASSED BY BILL; AMENDMENTS CHANGING PURPOSE. No law shall be passed, except by bill, and no bill shall be so amended in its passage through either House, as to change its original purpose.

6) Does the alleged ordinance enactment fully comply and comport with Art. 3, Sec. 31 of the Texas Constitution and remain inviolate of Art. 1, Sec. 29 of the Bill of Rights within same?

Sec. 31. ORIGINATION IN EITHER HOUSE; AMENDMENT. Bills may originate in either House, and, when passed by such House, may be amended, altered or rejected by the other.

7) Does the alleged ordinance enactment fully comply and comport with Art. 3, Sec. 32 of the Texas Constitution and remain inviolate of Art. 1, Sec. 29 of the Bill of Rights within same?

Sec. 32. READING ON THREE SEVERAL DAYS; SUSPENSION OF RULE. No bill shall have the force of a law, until it has been read on three several days in each House, and free discussion allowed thereon; but four-fifths of the House, in which the bill may be pending, may suspend this rule, the yeas and nays being taken on the question of suspension, and entered upon the journals.

8) Does the alleged ordinance enactment fully comply and comport with Art. 3, Sec. 33 of the Texas Constitution and remain inviolate of Art. 1, Sec. 29 of the Bill of Rights within same?

Sec. 33. REVENUE BILLS. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.

9) Does the alleged ordinance enactment fully comply and comport with Art. 3, Sec. 34 of the Texas Constitution and remain inviolate of Art. 1, Sec. 29 of the Bill of Rights within same?

Sec. 34. DEFEATED BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS. After a bill has been considered and defeated by either House of the Legislature, no bill containing the same substance, shall be passed into a law during the same session. After a resolution has been acted on and defeated, no resolution containing the same substance, shall be considered at the same session.

10) Does the alleged ordinance enactment fully comply and comport with Art. 3, Sec. 35 of the Texas Constitution and remain inviolate of Art. 1, Sec. 29 of the Bill of Rights within same?

Sec. 35. SUBJECTS AND TITLES OF BILLS.
(a) No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject.
(b) The rules of procedure of each house shall require that the subject of each bill be expressed in its title in a manner that gives the legislature and the public reasonable notice of that subject. The legislature is solely responsible for determining compliance with the rule.
(c) A law, including a law enacted before the effective date of this subsection, may not be held void on the basis of an insufficient title.

11) Does the alleged ordinance enactment fully comply and comport with Art. 3, Sec. 36 of the Texas Constitution and remain inviolate of Art. 1, Sec. 29 of the Bill of Rights within same?

Sec. 36. REVIVAL OR AMENDMENT BY REFERENCE; RE-ENACTMENT AND PUBLICATION AT LENGTH. No law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title; but in such case the act revived, or the section or sections amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length.

12) Does the alleged ordinance enactment fully comply and comport with Art. 3, Sec. 37 of the Texas Constitution and remain inviolate of Art. 1, Sec. 29 of the Bill of Rights within same?

Sec. 37. REFERENCE TO COMMITTEE AND REPORT. No bill shall be considered, unless it has been first referred to a committee and reported thereon, and no bill shall be passed which has not been presented and referred to and reported from a committee at least three days before the final adjournment of the Legislature.

13) Does the alleged ordinance enactment fully comply and comport with Art. 3, Sec. 38 of the Texas Constitution and remain inviolate of Art. 1, Sec. 29 of the Bill of Rights within same?

Sec. 38. SIGNING BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS; ENTRY ON JOURNALS. The presiding officer of each House shall, in the presence of the House over which he presides, sign all bills and joint resolutions passed by the Legislature, after their titles have been publicly read before signing; and the fact of signing shall be entered on the journals.

So, Mr./Ms. City Attorney, if I understand your position correctly, the city ordinance that you are attempting to subject me to in my private capacity, as one of the People of Texas, being fully protected from illegal and unconstitutional actions by my public servants in violation thereof, was not and is not in any way compliant with a single provision of any section of Art. 3, Secs. 29-38 of the Texas Constitution in order to have ANY force and effect of law pursuant Art. 3, Sec. 32 of same. Is THAT your position on this matter? If so, then I am forced to challenge your ordinance in federal court on grounds of knowing and willful violations of innumerable state and federal constitutional protections while acting under color of lawful authority as a political subdivision of the state.

Now, Mr./Ms. City Attorney, here’s your napkin, and please tell me how you would like to eat this shit pie you cooked up, one slice at a time or by me shoving the whole thing right down your throat?

 

__ General Notes on Ordinances Are Not Binding Public Law

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