If you want to have a good understanding of the “fruit of the poison tree” doctrine, which is VERY useful in getting illegally obtained evidence suppressed, making it inadmissible, then these are the go-to cases on that subject. I would highly recommend that you adopt such a desire ASAP, because knowing this can save you a lot of time and aggravation.

What kind of evidence? ANY evidence that was obtained in ANY sort of illegal search or seizure of you or your property, or forcibly seized or compelled production of information or documentation in violation of your 4th and 5th amendment right to remain silent and NOT provide evidence or testimony against oneself.

This would actually apply to things like driver’s licenses, financial responsibility documents, or anything else that can be used against you in a court of law or that might potentially incriminate you in some way, and all of which law enforcement demands presentation of once they make contact. IF the contact is the result of an alleged “traffic stop” THEN those documents and information CAN be used against you and CAN result in additional charges, giving you a United States Constitution’s 4th and 5th Amendment, and the Texas Constitution’s Bill of Rights under Article 1, Sec. 9, right to remain silent and refuse production. No statutory scheme can lawfully make this exercise of rights into a crime, but many states have tried to do so. IF the officer uses the invocation of your rights to refuse to produce potentially incriminating documents and information to charge you with additional crimes based upon that reservation of rights, THAT is a fundamentally protected rights violation from the get-go.

I have also included a link so you can read up on the legal meaning of the phrase.

LEARN THEM! USE THEM!

http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Fruit+of+the+…

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920)
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/251/385

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/371/471